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CHAPTER 11
Digitalization of Religion in Russia: Adjusting 




Facing religious life and religious practices that are traditionally conservative or 
even archaic, the “digital” has not yet transformed the field of religion in Russia 
as radically and visibly as some other areas, such as business, media, education, 
or culture. Nevertheless, the analysis of the digital in the religious sphere does 
not fit into simple statements, such as that religion is ancient, traditional and 
therefore—“natural,” while media are modern, upgrading and therefore—
“artificial”; it is far more complex (Lundby 2014).
Helland (2000) has made an important and heuristically promising distinc-
tion between “online religion” and “religion online”: religion online means 
the adoption of digital formats for conveying traditional religious information 
(dogmatic texts, worships, preaching, institutional information of all kinds), 
whereas online religion engages users in spiritual activity via the Internet, and 
this activity may be not in line with traditional religious practices and some-
times is in open opposition to them. This distinction, when applied to Russian 
religious life, gives a picture that is overwhelmingly dominated—quantitatively 
and qualitatively—by religion online, i.e. traditional discourse “repacked” into 
digital form and distributed through digital channels; online religion is mar-
ginal and almost invisible. The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) more and 
more effectively uses digital technologies, but still utilizes the Old Slavonic 
V. Khroul (*) 
Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia
188
language during liturgies. Muslim and Jewish communities use smartphone 
apps to calculate the correct time for prayers but pray in Arabic or Hebrew as 
in ages before. The inner, sacral religious space remains untouched by the 
“digital.”
Normatively, digitalization as such does not contradict the dogmatic of any 
traditional religion. In Christianity, Judaism, Islam and Buddhism, it is theo-
logically considered to be a neutral process with good or bad consequences 
depending on human will. Therefore, functionally digital technologies are seen 
by religious communities first of all as one more facility (channel, tool, space, 
network) for effective preaching, or Propaganda Fidei (the Propagation of the 
Faith) (Campbell 2005).
This chapter consists of three basic units. The first discusses religious orga-
nizations in Russia. The second analyzes religious digital practices, while the 
third section examines challenges for digitalization in religious sphere. Starting 
from a short description of the Russian religious landscape, we analyze norma-
tive and practical aspects of digitalization in the context of religion and then 
examine problematic areas of this process in Russia—the digital remapping of 
sacred and profane, the marginalization of religious minorities, forms of anti- 
digital resistance and extremism in the digital space.
11.2  russIan relIgIous landscape
The Constitution of the Russian Federation is considered by experts to be lib-
eral and democratic. It provides equal rights: “The state shall guarantee the 
equality of rights and liberties regardless of sex, race, nationality, language, 
origin, property or employment status, residence, attitude to religion, convic-
tions, membership of public associations or any other circumstance. Any 
restrictions of the rights of citizens on social, racial, national, linguistic or reli-
gious grounds shall be forbidden”; and also the freedom of religion “Everyone 
shall be guaranteed the right to freedom of conscience, to freedom of religious 
worship, including the right to profess, individually or jointly with others, any 
religion, or to profess no religion, to freely choose, possess and disseminate 
religious or other beliefs, and to act in conformity with them” (Constitution of 
the Russian Federation 1991).
The Government generally respects these rights in practice; however, in 
some cases authorities impose restrictions on certain (religious) groups.
The Russian law on religion (1997) recognized for all citizens the right to 
freedom of conscience and faith. It underlined the spiritual contribution of 
Orthodox Christianity to the history of Russia, and respect to Christianity, 
Islam, Buddhism and Judaism as so-called traditional religions.
When it comes to determining the numbers of followers of these religions, 
different approaches often give contradictory results. Moreover, the most nat-
ural approach, which is based on self-identification data, works well in most 
Western countries but fails in Russia. In practice, only a minority of citizens 
actively participate in any religion. Many who identify themselves as members 
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of a religious group participate in religious life rarely or not at all. There is no 
single set of reliable statistics about the religiosity of the Russian population.
According to the Pew Research Center, 71% of Russians are Orthodox 
Christians, 15% are not religious, 10% are Muslim, 2% are Christians of other 
denominations, and 1% belonged to other religions (Religious Belief 2017). 
But those who claim themselves to be Orthodox Christians, do not fit any tra-
ditional criteria of religiosity, such as church attendance and familiarity with 
basic dogmas of their faith. Radically different results are obtained by estimat-
ing the number of practicing adepts. For example, even though up to 70–80% 
of the Russian population identify themselves as Russian Orthodox, less than 
10% of them attend church services more than once a month and only 2–4% 
are considered to be integrated into church life. Moreover, the coverage in 
mainstream media strengthens the ethnic background of the religious identity. 
According to the Levada-Center, a correlation between “I am Russian” and “I 
am an Orthodox believer” has become stronger over the last two decades 
(Obŝestvennoe mnenie 2013, 118). Russian sociologist D. Furman suggested 
that the increase in ideological uncertainty and eclecticism, with beliefs in rein-
carnation and astrology, ufology, energy vampires, witches, shamans and so on, 
demonstrates that atheism still dominates in Russia (Furman and 
Kaariajnen 2006).
The Russian government evidently favors “traditional” religions, and most 
of all the ROC with budget financing of constructing and restoring church 
buildings and educational and social projects, which faces critique in the public 
sphere. For example, human rights activists quote the Russian Constitution 
and insist that the ROC and other religious organization should be separate 
from the state. Non-traditional religions, on the other hand, are marginalized, 
suppressed and even persecuted as sects (for example, Jehovah’s Witnesses).
According to the SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, the trend of 
increasingly restrictive policies toward Protestants and new religious move-
ments, especially Jehovah’s Witnesses intensified in 2019:
Persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses has become more large-scale and severe. 
Criminal prosecution for continuing the activities of an extremist organization, 
de facto for continuing the profession of religion, has already affected more than 
300 people. 18 of them were sentenced, half of them to prison time, including 
three who received six years in penal colony. This is the first time since the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses organization was banned that its believers were tortured dur-
ing criminal investigations. Numerous rough searches and arrests and confisca-
tion of community property continued. (Sibireva 2020)
Experts do not expect any liberalization in government policy as the year 
2020 started off with new imprisonment sentences and instances of Muslim 
communities that suffer as a result of the enforcement of so-called anti- 
extremism legislation. In addition, religious groups continue to face problems 
in the construction of new and continued use of existing buildings, risk 
11 DIGITALIZATION OF RELIGION IN RUSSIA: ADJUSTING PREACHING TO NEW… 
190
criminal prosecution based on the restrictions on missionary activities and are 
confronted with discrimination.
11.3  dIgItalIzatIon and relIgIon: normatIve aspects
The impact of digitalization on religious organizations and practices in Russia 
is best understood in the framework of mediatization. The notion of mediati-
zation has been applied to religion by Danish scholar Stig Hjarvard (2008). He 
suggested that in the digital era religion can no longer be studied separately 
from the media, because (a) media are for most people the primary source of 
their religious knowledge and religious imagination; (b) some social functions 
of religion are now primarily the functions of media; and (c) religious institu-
tions use media logic and media framing for their actions (Hjarvard 2008).
There are three main ways of mediatization of religions:
• Media allow, enable and assist the self-presentation of religions, observe 
their activities in the public interest by maintaining religious formats 
(broadcasting services, funerals, weddings, etc.)
• Media cover religious life (news reports, feature stories, etc.) and may 
have a critical approach towards some social activities or religious 
institutions.
• Media outlets may use religion for their own aims: selectively importing 
well-known religious symbols into entertainment, keeping out sacral 
meanings and secularizing the essence of religion. This process is out of 
the control of religious authorities and therefore causes many complaints 
and conflicts (Thomas 2015).
The first way of mediatization mentioned above is more or less self-evident 
and depends on the goodwill of media institutions and on audience demand. 
In most cases it keeps the religious format “untouched” and the media are used 
more as a channel of transmission rather than actively interacting with the sub-
ject. The second and the third ways presume a more active role of journalists 
covering religion. The process becomes more important and at the same time 
more problematic. Conflict and scandals are rooted in misunderstanding or in 
poor reporting on religious issues.
The historical analysis of religious media in Russia explicitly shows two 
stages: (a) a rapid development of all religious media (1990–1997) and (b) 
their stratification after the division of religions in 1997 into so-called tradi-
tional (Orthodox, Muslim, Jewish and Buddhist) and non-traditional (Catholic, 
Protestant, Hindu, new religious movements and others). Orthodox media are 
supported by the state, on national and regional levels. For example, Orthodox 
TV channel “Spas” is included into a number of federal channels transmitted 
all over Russia. Some of “non-traditional” religious media decided to choose 
the strategy of “self-silencing.”
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The situation in Russian news media and public sphere regarding religious 
issues differs from the situation in traditional Western democracies. The differ-
ences are rooted in the understanding of press and religious freedoms. To illus-
trate: while up to a million French people gathered to express their solidarity 
with the Charlie Hebdo journalists who were killed in Paris in January 2015 by 
terrorists who claimed to be Muslims, a few days later 1 million Russian citi-
zens—mostly Muslims and Orthodox Christians—came together on the streets 
of Grozny (the capital of Chechnya) to show their support for “Islamic values.”
In the Russian context, the mediatization of religion faces (1) ignorance 
towards ethics and social accountability of digital media practitioners, (2) a 
normatively disoriented audience with a low level of media literacy and reli-
gious practice, and (3) a predominantly secular public sphere with problems in 
social dialogue processing.
In ethical perspective, the Congress of Russia’s Journalists adopted a Code 
of Professional Ethics (1994). Journalistic standards listed in the Code are sim-
ilar to those adopted by journalists worldwide. However, its norms are hardly 
applied or respected by the majority of journalists.
TV remains the most important medium, and it does not appear that it will 
lose its prominence in the near future. Russia has become a “watching nation” 
instead of a “reading nation,” therefore for any actor seeking to have an impact 
on the general audience TV remains a strategic resource. Yet, contrary to 
European “success stories,” the history of the attempts to create Public TV in 
Russia and implement it into the existing media system in the last two decades 
has been marked by a series of failures.
The lack of journalistic self-reflection, the low level of media’s comprehen-
sion of their social mission and the ignorance concerning possible consequences 
sometimes led external structures (political, economic, social) to raise their 
warning voices. For example, the State Duma (Russian Parliament) on January 
23, 2015, called upon all journalists for more accurate and professional cover-
age of religious life in Russia and abroad. “The State Duma calls on all media 
and all journalists in Russia and foreign countries in covering events of a reli-
gious nature to be guided by the principles of ‘do no harm,’ to refer to the 
publication of materials that may affect and offend the religious feelings of citi-
zens with special responsibility and sensitivity,” the Duma statement says 
(Gosduma 2015).
The main dysfunctions in the coverage of religious life in Russia have been 
confirmed by different researchers (Kashinskaja et al. 2002; Khroul 2012):
• a biased approach among journalists, tolerated by their colleagues;
• a lack of education on religious issues and therefore a lack of understand-
ing of what is really going on;
• an urgent need of specialized media focused on religious life;
• secular media’s dependence on political and influential Russian Orthodox 
Church elites;
• the marginalization of religious minorities in the public sphere.
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From a religious perspective, the lack of knowledge about and experience of 
religious life among digital media practitioners gives much more space for 
myths and stereotypes in digital platforms. Moreover, not only the mass media 
but also religions themselves have to contribute to agenda setting and to elabo-
ration of digital mediatization mechanisms in this very sensitive sphere. In 
addition to difficulties of translation from the archaic language of the religious 
ghetto into a modern one and problems with understanding the internal func-
tionality of religious organizations, there are some social expectations religions 
do not meet.
At least two problematic areas in Russian society—“religious illiteracy” of 
journalists and “media illiteracy” among faith communities—could be opti-
mized with the clarification of mutual expectations from the perspective of 
“pluralism—dialogue—consensus” logic (Habermas 1989) (see Table 11.1).
11.4  relIgIous responses to the challenge 
of dIgItalIzatIon
Digitalization of religion is even more complex in Russia because of its poly- 
confessional and poly-ethnic social structure. The set of values promoted by 
ROC is questioned by many Russians. Yet, the ROC remains one of the most 
highly trusted social institutions and some anti-ROC campaigns and scandals 
(“Pussy Riot” punk prayer in Moscow Cathedral and others) have not signifi-
cantly decreased the trust in the ROC. Experts agree that, “a common trope 
Table 11.1 Religions and digital media normative expectations
Religions Digital media
Pluralism •  Try to ensure religious values 
transparency, availability of texts 
representing them clearly;
•  Seek correct articulation of their 
faith, use adequate symbolic 
systems, language and cultural 
codes.
•  Give platforms for complete spectrum 
of religions and normative models 
(with respect to minorities);
•  Optimize channels and information 
flows.
Dialogue •  Tolerate other approaches to 
religion with which they are not in 
agreement;
•  Use the framework of common 
cultural code;
•  Commit themselves to participate 
in the dialogue, send experts to be 
active in the public sphere.
•  Organize and support the search for 
new subjects of the dialogue;
•  Mediate, moderate, create forums for 
discussions;
•  Expand—quantitatively and 
qualitatively—the space for dialogue in 
various forms of communication.
Consensus • Are seeking the common good;
•  Are optimizing the “preaching,” 
the presentation of their vision 
from the perspective of consensus.
•  Consider consensus to be one of the 
most important goals of media;
•  Are peacemakers during conflicts and 
tensions;
• Develop openness and solidarity.
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for self-positioning of the Church is that the ROC is a ‘state-shaping’ religion, 
and as such it weaves its own historical narrative with the narrative of the 
Russian state” (Suslov et  al. 2015). Researchers emphasize the political and 
geopolitical components of Russian Orthodoxy and the importance of the con-
cept of “symphony”—harmonious relations of mutual support and mutual 
non-interference—between Church and state (Engström 2014; Papkova 2011; 
Simons and Westerlund 2015).
In order to make ROC more active in the digital space, Patriarch Kirill after 
his election and enthronization in 2009 announced the establishment of a new 
Sinodal’nyj informacionnyj otdel (Synodal Department of Information). In 
2010, an Orthodox video channel on YouTube (http://www.youtube.com/
user/russianchurch) was launched, and the Department of religious journalism 
and public relations at Russian Orthodox University was established.
Not all of more than 1000 Orthodox media outlets (most of them have digi-
tal versions) are in line with the ROC position, and some of them have a differ-
ent approach in commenting on everyday life. Some non-official outlets, like 
the magazine Tat’ânin Den’ and journal Foma—both founded in 1995—are 
not official and enjoy a larger degree of freedom of discussions than what is 
allowed at the official resources. Web portal “Pravoslavie i mir” (Orthodox 
Christianity and the World, www.pravmir.ru), launched in 2004, is currently the 
leading Orthodox multimedia portal publishing news and analytical reviews, 
comments and interviews, audio, video, info graphics. The audience of the por-
tal is around 2.5–3 million visitors per month, or 100–120 thousand per day.
According to Anna Danilova, the Editor-in-Chief of Pravmir.ru, there are sev-
eral essential negative presuppositions in Orthodox religious identity that affect 
the missionary work within digital media. “Still for a religious community the 
process of exploring new media normally is connected with at least these poten-
tial obstacles: (1) tendency of any religious institution to be conservative in 
everything including the media; (2) unclear impact of the new media on the 
psychological state, society and interpersonal relationships; (3) tendency to inter-
pret many innovation as ‘diabolic ones’ (one of the best cases of which was shown 
in the fear of many people in Russia to accept personal tax identification code, 
even though the Church has officially stated that it had nothing to do with the 
number of the Antichrist),” writes the Orthodox journalist (Danilova 2011, 20).
Chief editor of the portal “Bogoslov.ru”, archpriest and theologian Pavel 
Velikanov, mentioned three pros for digital activity of the Church: (1) the pos-
sibility of Christian witnessing, the ability to communicate with people looking 
for answers to their questions in social networks; (2) the possibility of Christian 
charity—according to the priest, “charitable organizations are active in net-
works and live through networks,” and (3) the rapid dissemination of informa-
tion. Contras, according to the theologian, are the reverse side of the pros: (1) 
it is very difficult to verify information; it often comes from not-trustworthy 
and strange sources; (2) discussions are conducted in a manner that is not 
appropriate for Christians; (3) people spend a lot of time on the social networks 
and come into the real world “just to eat” (Khroul 2015; quotations below see 
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ibid.). Danilova considered as positive the fact that social networks make it pos-
sible to get out of the “ghetto” of just the Orthodox audience and to under-
stand the agenda, to find out what people are now interested in. A negative 
point is the lack of information accuracy and difficulties with verification: 
“fakes” rapidly spread through social networks. On the negative side Danilova 
also mentioned the fact that social networking presumes too quick a reaction: 
“People react while they still do not really understand the situation, and rela-
tionships become strained,” Danilova said and called for general “Internet 
hygiene.”
Well-known Russian Orthodox journalist Sergej Hudiev suggested that it is 
difficult to divide the “plusses” and “minusses,” because most of the advan-
tages are at the same time disadvantages. The advantage of anonymity is that 
many people are able to overcome the exclusion zone between them and the 
clergy, but the disadvantage is that the question of anonymity removes inhibi-
tions of the people in the network: they cease to control what they say.
Russian TV commentator Elena Žosul, speaking about the advantages, 
noted that social networks are main sources of news; they allow to establish 
useful contacts and professional relationships and allow quick collective reflec-
tion about what is happening. On the negative side, she mentioned “the over-
flow of information and inability to concentrate on some issue, therefore long 
texts are so unpopular in the network.”
In order to prevent cybercrimes and the use of the digital space for pedo-
philia, pro-Orthodox organization “Liga bezopasnogo interneta” (League for a 
Safe Internet) was established in 2011 with support from the Ministry of 
Communication of the Russian Federation. “This organization set itself the 
task of fighting pedophilia and extremism on the internet, mostly by hands of 
the so called ‘cyber-warriors’ [kiberdružinniki], who provoke and expose 
pedophiles, and report about contentious websites to the law-enforcement 
bodies,” underlines Russian scholar Mihail Suslov (2015, 13).
The ROC has a leading position among religious communities involved in 
online communication; Muslim activity is not as expanded. The biggest and 
most influential Muslim digital resource in Russia is the Internet portal Islam.
ru, whose main goal is to protect the interests of traditional Muslims, as well as 
popularize the works of traditional Islamic values. It launched the first daily 
Islamic news feed and opened 13 thematic sections along with a full-fledged 
English version of the site. Beside news, Islam.ru publishes analytical articles, 
religious texts (in particular, prayers) and provides psychological, legal and 
theological advisory. The resource has pages on all popular social networks 
through which feedback from readers is maintained. Islam.ru opened the pos-
sibility to become a member of the Muslim community virtually. “People 
become Muslims because of their convictions and sincere faith. On the site, 
they can leave their data in order to inform the world about their decision,” 
said the chief editor of the Islam.ru Rinat Muhamedov (Luchenko 2008). 
There is a button “I accept Islam” on the Islam.ru website; pressing it is equal 
to publicly pronouncing the formula “There is no God but Allah, and 
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Mohammed is His prophet.” In addition to Islam.ru there are some indepen-
dent Muslim socio-political channels, such as “Voice of Islam,” “Russian 
Islamist”, as well as educational projects.
Jewish, Catholic and Protestant digital resources are focused mostly ad 
intra, serving local communities and those who show some interest in them. 
Together with other non-traditional religious media and networks, they are 
marginal and less visible in the Russian public sphere in comparison to the 
dominant Orthodox and Muslim religious communities.
The only major television project for Russian Protestants is “Television of 
Good News,” which began as part of the global Trinity Broadcasting Network 
(TBN) and now is positioning itself as an independent public broadcaster. 
Without any doubt, this is the biggest Protestant media resource that broad-
casts via satellites and cable networks. Protestant radio “Teos” lost its frequency 
and is now a fully Internet-based station. Nevertheless, it is developing, invit-
ing interesting presenters, such as Orthodox journalist Sergej Hudiev and a 
number of others, trying to be interesting and relevant to a wide range of audi-
ences, not only for Protestants. Newspaper “Mirt” is a serious newspaper for 
ministers and parishioners, publishing reflections and sermons, sometimes not 
understandable to non-Protestants. There are also a number of successful 
printed media outlets outside Moscow and Saint Petersburg: newspapers in 
Yaroslavl, Penza, Yoshkar-Ola, Voronezh, Vladivostok, Irkutsk, and other cities 
of Russia. Among the Internet portals the leading project is Protestant.ru that 
presents a good example of successful migration from a printed newspaper to 
web portal. The press secretary of the Union of Christians of Evangelical Faith 
(Pentecostals) in Russia Anton Kruglikov pointed out two major visible trends 
in Protestant media: (1) to move content from printed media to digital plat-
forms and (2) to address the general public, not only those who already are 
Protestants.
Generally speaking, there are several problematic areas in religious digi-
tal media:
 1. Subordination of journalism to public relations (PR). Many of the employ-
ees of religious media in Russia find themselves serving the religious 
institutions in terms of public relations and advertising much more than 
following journalistic standards. Both the employers and the employees 
do not find such a situation strange.
 2. Out of touch with mission and target audience. Digital religious media fall 
into the trap of thinking that their structure would be “media for all,” 
but in reality, they find themselves with an unclear mission and tar-
get audience.
 3. Populism and primitivism. In order to be closer to common people, digi-
tal religious media sometimes pursue populism through primitivism of 
the message. Such a simplification creates a distorted image of the reli-
gious reality and also “corrupts” the religious view of cultural and social 
issues in Russia.
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 4. Conflict of formats. Digital religious media lack a language that is clear 
and understandable for the general public. In many cases, because of the 
language secular journalists have the impression that religious world is 
strange and hard to cover, therefore it is underexposed and finds itself ad 
marginem of the national media system.
 5. Religious media as the “ghetto”. Religious media still do not realize the 
need to be part of social dialogue. Meanwhile, media and digital culture 
is increasingly becoming a space of public life and cognition.
 6. Lack of professionalism is not understood as a problem. The lack or total 
absence of professionalism in religious media often is not considered to 
be something inappropriate.
 7. Religious media are still run mostly by enthusiasts. In many cases the edi-
torial staff ’s enthusiasm does not receive any moral (and more material) 
support and understanding from the hierarchy of religious organizations, 
and that makes synergetic strategic planning and systematic work 
hardly possible.
So, from a religious perspective there are evident problems with news pro-
duction, channeling, transmitting, broadcasting, with interaction and under-
standing; therefore, the voices of religious leaders are hardly heard in society 
(for more on digital journalism beyond religion, see Chap. 9).
11.5  sacred and profane: dIgItal remappIng
In the Russian digital sphere, there are two major contextual challenges for 
Durkheim’s sacred-profane dichotomy (Durkheim 1915, 47): the enforced 
atheization during the Communist time and, after it, the religious revival in the 
context of secularization. Digitalization speeds up the remapping of the social 
space with sacred and profane markers: some profane objects and social prac-
tices have been sacralized, while some traditional religious ceremonies and 
sacred objects have been profanized. Digitalization can also lead to re- 
sacralization, to the creation of new sacred objects, new mysteries, and new 
explanations for events of supernatural origin.
The last two decades of the digital era have been a time of continuous 
sacred-profane remapping in Russia. Russian feminist punk rock group “Pussy 
Riot” staged a performance in Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Savior in 
February 2012, which was stopped by church security guards. Online video 
sharing was essential for Pussy Riot’s performance to reach an audience and 
create the scandal it created. Six months after, three members of Pussy Riot 
were convicted of hooliganism motivated by religious hatred and sentenced to 
two years imprisonment. Different ecclesiastics reactions followed the “punk- 
prayer” by Pussy Riot. Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin appealed to “criminal 
sanctions for everyone, who affronts the faithful sense,” while at the same time 
deacon Andrei Kuraev commented on the event on his LiveJournal in the 
opposite way: “If I were a sacristan of the Cathedral I would feed them with 
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pancakes, give a cup of mead to each of them and invite them to come round 
for a confession. And if I were an old layman, I would pinch them a bit at part-
ing … Just to make wise” (Kuraev 2012).
The more recent debate on “Matilda,” a film directed by the Russian film- 
maker Aleksei Uchitel, which tells the story of a romance between the future 
Tsar Nicholas II, canonized by the Russian Orthodox church in 2000, and 
Matilda Kshesinskaya, a teenage prima ballerina at the Mariinsky theatre in St. 
Petersburg, is a good example of the “sacralization” trend in the Russian public 
sphere and how it is supported by media. Radical Russian Orthodox move-
ments warned that “cinemas will burn” if Matilda was screened, because the 
film portrays the “holy tsar” in love scenes. In response to the threats, the larg-
est network of cinemas in Russia in September 2017 refused to screen the film 
because of safety reasons. Various other spontaneous, grass-roots public initia-
tives in Russia (e.g. icons of Stalin painted with the nimbus as a saint, protests 
against digitalization in order to avoid the “number of devil” appearing in the 
documents) are not in line either with Church teaching or with government 
intentions, but widely covered by media, inspiring the sacralization of, for 
example Stalin or Ivan IV Terrible.
Another example—heavily rooted in digital media support—is the process 
of “sacralization” of Epiphany bathing (ice swimming). Ice swimming has been 
practiced in Russia for centuries and some historians suggest that the practice 
was a popular pagan tradition. Every year on Epiphany (January 19 in Russia), 
Russian Orthodox believers are plunged into a blessed section of frozen water 
three times in remembrance of Jesus’ baptism in the river Jordan by John the 
Baptist. In 2019, almost 460 thousand people took part in the Epiphany bath 
in Moscow, and over 2.4  million in Russia (for comparison—in 2018: 150 
thousand in Moscow and over 1.8  million in the entire country). Russian 
President Vladimir Putin traditionally, year-by-year, attends a religious service 
and also participates in Epiphany bathing. Even the US ambassador to the 
Russian Federation John Huntsman, a Mormon by faith, took part in Epiphany 
bathing in 2018 and called this ritual “the great Russian tradition.” The 
Moscow authorities published on the Mayor’s website the “rules of baptismal 
bathing,” which did not contain a word about the religious character of the 
act. And the mayor of the city of Yaroslavl, with the words “you are Orthodox 
people”, convincingly asked the officials to lead the bathing. Generally speak-
ing, Epiphany bathing has become a huge media event covered by all the major 
media in Russia and abroad—covered as religious tradition, as something all 
Russian Orthodox Christians are called to do, as a ritual blessed by the Church.
In fact, many Russian Orthodox bishops and priest condemned this ritual 
and called on believers not to take part in it and invited them to attend Epiphany 
liturgy instead. Bishop Evtikhy of Domodedovo put forward four reasons for 
this: (1) ice swimming is dangerous for the health, it contradicts the Gospel 
and therefore it is a sin; (2) bathing is a profanation of the sacred—blessed 
water; (3) bathing is not traditional for the Russian Orthodox Church and (4) 
it strengthens not faith, but superstitions (Evtikhy (Kurochkin) 2019). Such a 
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negative approach to Epiphany bathing was evident in previous centuries. 
“Bathing violates the sanctity and contradicts to the spirit of true Christianity; 
therefore, it cannot be tolerated and must be condemned,” wrote priest Sergij 
Bulgakov in the end of nineteenth century (Bulgakov 1913).
This opinion is low profiled both by media and state authorities and there-
fore not heard in the public sphere. Both media and politicians gain symbolic 
capital during Epiphany bathing ignoring the position of priests and bishops 
who have never been in fact proclaimed loudly “ex cathedra,” and therefore 
the ROC’s ecclesial approach to Epiphany bathing is not clear and understand-
able for the general public in Russia.
As Kseniya Luchenko mentioned, high-quality Church-related discussions 
are conducted not in mainstream media, but predominantly in digital social 
networks. “The answer to that question is closely linked to the analysis of dia-
logue culture in Russian society as a whole. Social institutions and mechanisms 
that are supposed to ensure and sustain that dialogue are overwhelmingly out 
of order. However, the need to discuss, share experiences and monitor publica-
tions is still there. And social networks make it possible,” the Russian scholar 
suggested (Luchenko 2015, 130). Almost all of the largest Orthodox websites 
have pages on social networks, such as VKontakte, Odnoklassniki and Facebook. 
On these social networks there are special pages of ecclesiastics, groups con-
nected to parishes, with Orthodox public associations or churches.
The analysis of the self-expressions and discussions on religious topics in the 
digital platforms shows that young Russians, in matters of belief/disbelief, rely 
mainly on their own experience and the experience of other people (family and 
friends), and not on faith, authority or tradition, as would be expected (Khroul 
2015). The most convincing is the socio-historical explanation for this phe-
nomenon: the Russian tradition of faith that was consistently eradicated over a 
fairly long period of time. Minimizing appeals to faith, tradition and authority 
is a “birthmark” of Russian history, which can be described in terms of “post- 
atheism trauma.”
Paradoxically, the Internet users in their self-expression make evident their 
mostly positive attitudes towards God and predominantly negative attitudes 
towards Orthodox Christianity and Russian Orthodox Church. The social and 
political activity of the ROC faces more criticism than Orthodox Christianity as 
a religion: for example, “ROC proposal to impose a dress code for the people 
of Russia,” “ROC proposes to create a criminal penalty for heresy.” This sug-
gestion may be proven not only quantitatively but also qualitatively, with the 
rhetoric of users’ voices: “ROC is a business project”; “ROC, in most cases do 
not care about people, but about the godless government,” “I love the 
Orthodox religion and Orthodox culture, myself, am an Orthodox man, but 
terribly hate ROC.” The arguments of those who are in favor of ROC and 
defend it are mostly rooted in ethnic and geopolitical discourse: “I am Russian 
and therefore I am an Orthodox. It is natural”; “ROC is an integral part of the 
thousand-year history of Russia, she has always supported our morals and I will 
always be with her, as the rest of the true believers.”
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In 2012, a content analysis study of Russian digital Internet communication 
texts found observable “traces” of mainstream media publications (predomi-
nantly TV) against so-called non-traditional religious organizations (Khroul 
2016). Consider, for example, some opinions on Jehovah Witnesses’ (JW) 
activities published on the website lovehate.ru: “According to news shows, 
journalists covered how some sect engaged in raping children”; “Recently in 
the news on TV it was said that a 50-year-old man, a Jehovah’s Witness, set 
himself on fire. He considered himself a great sinner who had allegedly had to 
wash away his sins. Thus, we see what this sect leads us to”; “This is a false 
religion, which is no good and kills a person (religiously destructive sect)”; 
“This is the most vile of sects, posing as Christianity. In fact, what we have is a 
simple case of Freemasons.” The analysis of the texts makes visible two impor-
tant things: (1) behavioral attitudes of intolerance with respect to the JW, and 
(2) the willingness of people to take tough repressive measures against JW from 
the state. In sum, this “explosive mixture” is already provoking a request to the 
authorities, as in the case of aggravating state–religious relations or the case for 
a need to find another “enemy”. It can become a “trigger” for negative mea-
sures taken not only against the JW but also against other so-called non- 
traditional religions, who at the current juncture come across as an easy target. 
Indeed, JW were banned in Russia in April 2017 by the decision on the 
Supreme Court, and in February 2019 the Russian court for the first time 
found a Jehovah’s Witness, Danish national Dennis Christensen, guilty of 
extremism and sentenced him to 6 years behind bars (Russian Court 2019).
From a journalistic perspective, there is a visible problem of journalistic 
autonomy. According to recent studies, journalists in Russia do not enjoy 
autonomy because of their political and economic dependence. Secondly, the 
challenge of objectivity is apparent, which leads to a poor and stereotyped cov-
erage of religious life in secular media. Agenda-setting process in media is not 
ethical-oriented: the main players are mostly focused not on the audience or on 
public interest, but on political subordination and commercial profit, therefore 
moral issues are secondary. Therefore, religious media are not able to change 
the content management: “infotainment” and “advertainment” oriented 
media decision makers do not seem to be concerned with fitting their products 
into even secular moral norms, so religious norms as more strict are ever more 
ignored.
11.6  challenges of dIgItalIzatIon 
In relIgIous perspectIve
For religions in Russia, all visible and invisible challenges and threats of digital 
communication—non-hierarchical structure, lack of authority, dogmatic cor-
ruption, information noise, fake news dissemination—seemed to be not so 
dangerous in comparison with their advantages and benefits and therefore 
manageable. Therefore, the concerns of Russian religious leaders with regard 
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to digital technologies are mostly (with some rare exceptions) focused on mis-
uses of them in particular cases (the spread of heresies, online pornography, 
gaming addiction, playing Pokémon Go in church, etc.).
Nevertheless, there are visible “grassroots” protests among Russian 
Orthodox fundamentalists against digitalization in general. According to these 
fundamentalists, digitalization in the context of religion is not limited to its 
technological side, as it is always a threat. Moreover, for some ultraconservative 
Russian Orthodox Christians the “digital” as such has ontologically negative 
connotations related to “the number of the beast” and the process of the digi-
talization is seen as a visible sign of the Apocalypse, the end of the world.
Therefore, digitalization was accompanied with protests against, for exam-
ple, the “barcode” or “666” digits in the passport numbers of some Orthodox 
believers. Paradoxically, the campaign against individual tax numbers (INN) in 
2000 became the first civil action of a religious nature in Russia, in which the 
Internet was used as a tool of influence, the main mean of information exchange. 
Individual tax number opponents using digital platforms and channels brought 
this topic onto the agenda of mainstream media and of church–state relations 
(Luchenko 2008). The movements against electronic control and globaliza-
tion processes are widely using one of the main tools of globalization—the 
Internet. While widely rumored, these views still are marginal in Russian media 
and public sphere.
Various semi-pagan cults and self-proclaimed “prophets,” who previously 
were not known beyond the regions of their activity, nowadays cover the entire 
territory of the country, thanks to digital network channels. In 2008, the case 
of the so-called Penza hermits—a group of believers who reject the founda-
tions of modern society and the state and spent more than half a year, having 
closed themselves in in a dugout in the Penza region, became widely known 
(New Cult 2008). The spread of myths about the “sanctity” of Ivan the 
Terrible, Grigori Rasputin, Russian Emperor Pavel I, and voices demanding 
their canonization by the ROC would not be so successful without digital net-
works. Moreover, some informal groups that hold completely different views 
and have completely different goals can act in the digital space on behalf of the 
Orthodox or Muslim, Jewish, Catholic, Protestant communities. The general 
shift of these movements toward greater radicalism seems to be consequent; 
since the center of social and political discussion in the digital world is shifting 
towards oppositional radical structures, it is easier to act on the Internet, exag-
gerating their ideology.
Yet, the biggest concern in terms of social security in the digital space is 
raised by radical extremist networking. After Twitter closed more than 300 
thousand accounts on suspicion of spreading extremist ideology in 2015, the 
followers of the so-called Islamic state (IS) became more embittered on 
Telegram messenger (total number of users exceeded 100 million). Telegram 
officials informed that they suppressed activities related to extremism in public 
channels, but do not monitor private chats (encrypted and secret). On 
November 18, 2015, Telegram announced the blocking of 78 public channels, 
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connected with the IS extremist group (banned in Russia). Fundamentalists 
used 12 languages for digital extremist propaganda. After that case, the FSB 
(Federal’naâ služba bezopasnosti, Federal Security Service) head Aleksandr 
Bortnikov considered the possibility of restricting Russians’ access to Telegram 
(RBC 2015), but this initiative was not implemented at that time.
At the same time religious organizations use various digital channels of mass 
communication with missionary goals, as well as to maintain the integrity of 
the religious community and its development, to ensure the necessary informa-
tion exchange in modern conditions. For the ROC, one of the main functions 
of the Internet is an electronic document management system that allows its 
structures and administrative units to more effectively coordinate their activities.
Despite the use of tablets and smartphones in order to follow the worships 
and using digital TV for live transmissions of religious events (some of which 
also became media events), and despite being involved more actively in web- 
based content production and consumption, for many Russians the core of 
religious practices still remains based on interpersonal communication.
11.7  conclusIon
In spring 2020, the reactions of Russia’s various religions communities to the 
coronavirus pandemic were noticeably different, once more confirming the 
diversity of practices sketched in this chapter. While most places of worship 
were closed or switched to online services, some bishops in the Russian 
Orthodox Church insisted they would not stop in-person services or the tradi-
tion of kissing icons. Another traditional ritual in times of emergency took 
place in Moscow on 3 April: Patriarch Kirill took a miraculous icon of Maria, 
Mother of God, and made a round trip through Moscow, praying to save the 
city from the coronavirus.
Digitalization had a tremendous impact on religions practices during the 
pandemic as believers got a chance to participate in worships digitally at a dis-
tance. For example, Catholic masses all over Russia were broadcast online. 
Moreover, in the opinion of the Russian Orthodox Church, even the sacra-
ment of confession became possible online. If a person wants to confess during 
self-isolation because of the coronavirus, then “in exceptional circumstances 
they can confess by phone or Skype,” said Metropolitan Hilarion, the head of 
the ROC Synodal Department for External Church Relations (RIA 
Novosti 2020).
The use of religious apps has brought about a diverse range of religious 
practices (e.g. confession by smartphone) that often fall outside traditional 
thinking, yet the rituals performed with these apps are felt to be authentic 
(Scott 2016). The digital network structure also frees users from the need to 
integrate into strict hierarchical systems and rigorously participate in rituals—
that is, from important elements of institutionalized religions. In the wake of 
the turn from religiosity to spirituality, user practices have become increasingly 
diverse, sometimes deviating from church (in the case of Christianity) 
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doctrines. Moreover, the individualization of religious practices leads to a situ-
ation in which church authorities lose their status as the final ethical and dog-
matic referee.
Opening new channels and platforms for information flows, the digital era 
created opportunities and challenges both for religious institutions (new for-
mats, genres, packages for preaching and communications) and for individual 
religiosity (variety of information sources, shift from interpersonal to digitally 
mediated communication). As this chapter has shown, digital technologies as a 
shaping force make religious life more transparent (challenging hierarchical 
information filters and church secrets), more liquid (after centuries of stability), 
and more ambivalent and pluralistic in terms of values and practices.
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